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Moore: Patterson v. McLean

PATTERSON v. McLEAN CREDIT
UNION: RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION BY PRIVATE
ACTORS AND RACIAL
HARASSMENT UNDER SECTION
1981
Helen J. Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's narrow construction in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union l of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,2 which derives from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,3 reduced the protection afforded by
section 1981 against racial discrimination, and diminished substantially the options faced by victims of racial discrimination
for relief under federaf law. The Patterson Court held that it
would not overrule its decision in Runyon v. McCrary' that section 1981 prohibits private, as well as state action, which
amounts to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts. Ii But it then held that the portion of section 1981
which guarantees freedom from racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of contracts does not apply to racial
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law; M.B.A., 1988, University of
Louisville; B.A., 1981, Kentucky College.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
3. Ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
5. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
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harassment which becomes manifest after contract formation. 8
Patterson's narrow construction of discrimination in the making
and enforcement of contracts left section 1981 virtually useless
against racial discrimination, in spite of the affirmance of
Runyon.

Patterson involved allegations by a black female employee
of a credit union that she was harassed by her employer based
on her race. She alleged that she was harassed, subjected to abusive comments, and treated differently from whites regarding
wage increases, amount of work assignments, type of work assignments, promotions, and performance evaluations. The majority held that section 1981's guarantee of non-discrimination in
the making of contracts does not apply to her facts. It held that
the section "extends only to the formation of a contract, but not
to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment."7
This Note argues that had the Patterson Court considered
the evidence of congressional intent and concern in its interpretation of section 1981, and had it placed more weight on policy
considerations, it would have held that section 1981 prohibits racial harassment. The Note shows that, as decided, the Patterson
decision will leave many victims of contractual racial harassment
with an inadequate remedy, or with no remedy at all, because
the closest alternative to section 1981, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,8 is much less effective than section 1981, and
because Patterson's narrow construction of section 1981 deters
the filing of employment discrimination claims. The result will
be that racial harassment in the United States will be allowed to
continue and increase. 9
6. [d.

7. [d. at 2372.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
9. The similarities in the operation and effects of state treatment of race and sex
discrimination make the Patterson result particularly important to women. "As bases for
classification, sex and race share three important similarities: (1) by and large, members
of the subordinate group are readily identifiable; (2) membership in the "inferior" group
is initially nonvolitional; and (3) once acquired, this membership cannot be renounced."
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 739 (1971).
The effects of the two forms of discrimination are equally similar. "A general pattern of economic and political disadvantage is easily demonstrable in both cases ....
When it enforces either kind of discrimination with a broad range of sanctions, the state
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II. BACKGROUND
The legislation at issue in Patterson, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, derives from America's Civil War and post-Civil War experience. That experience had a profound effect on the attitudes of
federal lawmakers toward both the fight against racial inequality
and the role of the federal government in that fight.IO The
Union's defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War was much
more than a return to the status quo; the defeat of the rebellion
and the abolition of slavery ushered in a full revolution. Politics,
labor relations, racial relations, the social order, the economy,
and the allocation of resources were drastically and permanently
altered. ll One revolutionary change was the expansion of the
powers of the federal government during the war. The federal
(Union) government was forced during the war to take an active
role in industry, finance, and agriculture. This led to a federal
government with a much larger income, bureaucracy, and responsibility, and it reversed completely the prewar balance of
power between the federal and state governments. I2
Moreover, the Emancipation Proclamation had given this
new, strong federal government a moral purpose - that of "custodian of freedom"13 and protector of human equality and
human rights. The Thirty-ninth Congress, which convened following the close of the Civil War, was disturbed by the evidence
before it of continuing racial inequality in the South. I" Congress
believed that it had the power to end such inequality. I II The
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1875 are some of the Reconstruction Congress' efforts to end inequality and protect the civil
rights of all citizens. I6 The history of the passage of these laws
encourages its citizens to relate to each other according to group stereotypes, rather than
as individuals." Id. at 740. Given these similarities, the state's attitudes and reactions
toward one form of discrimination are highly likely to be the same toward the other.
10. See Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the
Proper Scope of Section 1981,98 YALE L.J. 541, 547-51 (1989).
11. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. 1863-1877, at 24
(1989).
12.
L. REV.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 23; Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
1323, 1323-24 (1952).
E. FONER, supra note 11, at 24.
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548; Gressman, supra note 12, at 1325-26.
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548.
Gressman, supra note 12, at 1323-36.
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sheds light on Congress' intent regarding them, and should be
considered in any attempt to interpret them.

A.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1866

Immediately after the end of the Civil War, President
Andrew Johnson began to implement his plan of reconstruction.
Many of the radical members of his Republican Party wished
that he would make black suffrage a requirement for readmission of the southern states to the union. 17 Instead, Johnson's
plan required only that the individuals who had participated in
the rebellion pledge an oath of loyalty to the union and support
for emancipation. In return, these individuals would receive amnesty, pardon, and restoration of all rights to property (except
for slaves}.18 Only those pardoned, a group that did not include
blacks, were to be qualified to vote. 19 Johnson also appointed
provisional governors of the southern states as part of his plan. 20
Johnson's plan was premised on his belief that the federal government lacked the power to impose the requirement of black
suffrage on the states and on the belief that blacks had no role
to play in the reconstruction of the southern states.21
Johnson's plan called for federal involvement with the
South's reconstruction to stop with these measures, and for the
southern states, with their newly readmitted citizens and newly
appointed provisional governors, to take .charge of the transition
from slavery to freedom.22 During the rest of 1865 the southern
states held constitutional conventions and elected legislators,
governors, and members of Congress. 28 When these elections
were completed Johnson deemed the work of reconstructing the
south complete. 24
Yet the course of events in the south made it apparent that
the work of reconstruction was far from complete. The newly
17. E.

FONER,

supra note 11, at 178.

18. [d. at 183.
19. [d.

20. [d. at 183-87.
21. [d. at 178-84. The latter belief stemmed from Johnson's own racial prejudices

and his belief that his chances for reelection were greatest if he won the favor of the
white southern yeomen (small farmer) and planter aristocracy classes. [d. at 191.
22. See id. at 189.
23. [d. at 193-96.
24. [d. at 196.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss3/6

4

Moore: Patterson v. McLean

~990]

PATTERSON v. McLEAN

621

reconstructed state legislatures immediately adopted Black
Codes, which sought to confine blacks to a condition as close to
slavery as possible, maintaining the south's pre-war social and
economic order. 211 These laws were enforced by a police and judicial system that excluded blacks entirely.28 State militia, urban
police forces, and courts were staffed exclusively with whites. 27
Militiamen patrolled the counties and often terrorized the black
population by abusing them and ransacking their homes. 28 Furthermore, lynchings and violence against blacks at the hands of
private individuals were widespread at this time. 29
This course of events was disturbing to both the radical and
moderate politicians in Washington. When the Thirty-ninth
Congress convened in December of 1865, the Republican majority excluded the newly elected southern congressmen and set up
the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction in order to
initiate its own plan of Reconstruction. 30 Congress also sought to
enact legislation effectuating the thirteenth amendment, which
was ratified in December of 1865. 31
25. Id. at 198-99. For example, in Mississippi, postbellum Black Codes of 1865 provided the following: Negroes could rent or lease land only in incorporated cities or towns,
"in which the corporate authorities shall control the same"; contracts for labor made
with Negroes for a period of longer than one month must be in writing; if a Negro laborer should quit before the end of the contract term then he would forfeit wages earned
before quitting; any person may arrest and carry such a Negro worker back. to his employer, and that person would receive a reward deducted from the Negro worker's wages;
it was a criminal offense to attempt to persuade a Negro worker to leave his employer
before the end of the contract term or to knowingly give or sell to such worker any food,
clothing or employment; the names of all Negro children under eighteen' who were not
supported by parents were to be reported to the probate court, and these children were
to be apprenticed to "some competent and suitable person," preferably their former
master; deserting apprentices were to be arrested and punished in the same manner as
deserting Negro workers; Negroes over eighteen "with no lawful employment or business,
or found unlawfully assembling themselves together," would be deemed vagrants; white
persons assembling with Negroes or "usually associating" with Negroes "on terms of
equality" were also deemed vagrants. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES. A CENTURY OF .CIVIL
RIGHTS 13-15 (1961).
26. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 203.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29. See Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification
for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1026 (1972).
30. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 43.
31. The thirteenth amendment states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an early and major work of
the Thirty-ninth Congress toward the guarantee and protection
of civil rights. Section one of the Act declares:
All persons born in the United States ... are citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude .
. . shall have the same right in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
to the contrary notwithstanding. 32
The Act gave federal officers and the federal courts the power to
enforce its provisions. 33
When it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Thirtyninth Congress had evidence before it of grave racial inequality
in the south, including the Black Codes, discrimination by private individuals, and onerous working conditions for blacks, and
Congress was disturbed by such evidence. 34 In addition, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 Congress was implementing its
own plan of Reconstruction in order to bring about more radical
changes in the southern racial order than those called for in
Johnson's plan. Given these historical indications of congressional concern, it is highly probable that Congress intended a
broad construction of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
32. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
33. [d.
34. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 551-56.
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President Johnson vetoed the act. 31i He objected to the provision which declared all native born persons citizens, including
Gypsies, Negroes, and some American Indians. He argued that
these people should be required to demonstrate their fitness to
become citizens, as aliens must. 36 He also argued that the bill
exceeded the scope of the thirteenth amendment. Johnson believed that the thirteenth amendment merely abolished the
master-slave relationship, hence that the bill provided to Congress much greater power than the amendment authorized. 37
The doubts as to the constitutionality of this Act raised by
the President and by its congressional opponents stimulated
Congress to pass the fourteenth amendment. 38 The purpose of
the fourteenth amendment,39 passed on June 13, 1866, was to
make the centralization of civil rights authority in the federal
government permanent, to assure that most of the President's
constitutional objections to the Act would be removed, and to
guarantee to all individuals citizenship and full protection of the
laws.'o The fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868.
Congressional concern over civil rights is manifest in two
other legacies of this era: the fifteenth amendment,oU ratified in
March of 1870,42 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870,43 which was
35. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 49.
36.Id.
37.Id.
38. Id. at 51.
39. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 51·56.
41. Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment states:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
U.S. CON ST. amend. XV, § 1.
42. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 57.
43. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
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enacted under the authority granted to Congress by the fourteenth amendment. A primary aim of the Civil Rights Act of
1870 was to ensure voting rights to black citizens." In addition,
because doubts still lingered about whether the thirteenth
amendment provided the authority to pass the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, that Act was reenacted in its entirety in section 18 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1870. 411 The idea was that reenacting the
earlier Act pursuant to the fourteenth amendment would remove doubts as to the constitutionality of the earlier Act. 46 Furthermore, at the time the 1870 Act was proposed, discrimination
against immigrants to the United States, especially the Chinese,
was rampant.'7 Section 16 of the 1870 Act was enacted for the
protection of these aliens. 4s Section 16 is identical to section 1 of
the 1866 Act, except that it uses the words "all persons" instead
of "all citizens" in its guarantee of civil rights.'9
44. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 57.
See Note, supra note 29, at 1030-31.

45.
46.
47.
48.

[d.
[d. at 1030.
[d.

49. The virtually identical language of sections 16 and 18 of the 1870 Act has caused
a controversy over the origin of the present section 1981. The problem in tracing the
origin of the present section 1981 was created in 1874 when all the statutes of the United
States were consolidated and revised. Section 1981 (then section 1977) appeared in its
present form in the 1874 revised statutes along with a codifier's historical note saying
that it was derived from section 16 of the 1870 Act. The note did not mention section 18
of the 1870 Act. Section 1982 also appears in its present form along with a note listing
the 1866 Act as its source.
If the codifiers's note to section 1977 (the present 1981) is correct, then that section
is based solely on the fourteenth amendment, 'which applies only to state action, because
section 16 of the 1870 Act was passed only under that amendment. However, section 18
of the 1870 Act was passed under both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Thus
if the codifier's note is incorrect, then section 1981 is derived from both sections 16 and
18 of the 1870 Act, thus from both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and may
be interpreted to reach private as well as state action.
Proponents of the view that section 1981 derives from both sections 16 and 18 of the
1870 Act believe that the codifier made the mistake of assuming that the rights guaranteed by section 18 of the 1870 Act were covered by the broader language of section 16 of
the 1870 Act. They believe that this assumption is contrary to the intent of Congress,
which in 1870 deliberately enacted both sections 16 and 18 because the two sections
protected two different classes of individuals. Proponents of this belief point out that the
codifier was not authorized to make any substantive changes in the law, and that he
ignored a basic rule of statutory construction, which is that no two parts of the same
document be construed as covering the same ground.
Opponents of this view point simply to the codifier's note, which mentions only section 16, to the similar "all persons" language in section 16 of the 1870 Act and section
1981, and to several old Supreme Court cases which hold that section 1981 was derived
solely from section 16.
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Reconstruction was an important period in the advancement of the federal government's legal protection of civil rights.
The three Civil War constitutional amendments and the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1875110 were the results of the Reconstruction Congress' efforts to build a comprehensive civil
rights program. During Reconstruction the balance between federal and state power was altered significantly, and the federal
government was given broad powers through a comprehensive
set of laws to combat racial discrimination and to protect individual civil rights. III Whereas the first ten amendments were
passed in order to restrict the power of the federal government,
and reflected the new nation's fear of powerful central governments, the three Civil War amendments elevated the role of the
federal government to that of protector of individual civil
rights. 1I2
Justice Swayne, dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases,1I3
stated that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments
are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of the country.
They trench directly upon the power of the
States, and deeply affect those bodies. They are,
in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first
eleven.
Fairly construed these amendments may be
said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna
Charta. G4
For authority supporting the view that the codifier's note is incorrect, see Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976); Note, Section 1981 and Priuate Discrimination:
An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1037-39
(1972); Note, Runyon u. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens the Doors of Discriminatory Priuate Schools, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 179, 187-89 (1977).
For authority supporting the view that the codifier's note is correct, see Runyon; 427
U.S. at 195 & n.6 (White, J., dissenting); Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212, 1216
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
50. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
51. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1323.
52. See id.
53. 83 ·U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
54. [d. at 125 (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court would soon take most of the life out of
many of these laws. Ii Ii Yet even today they are not completely
gone, nor has hope vanished that they will one day be revitalized
and used in the spirit in which they were passed - to eradicate
inequality.
B.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THESE LAWS FROM THEIR ORI-

GIN TO THE PRESENT

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not enforced by the Supreme Court for over 100 years, until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
CO.Ii6 and Runyon v. McCrary.Ii7 In the interim, a series of Supreme Court decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries declared several provisions of the Reconstruction era
statutes unconstitutional and interpreted others extremely narrowly.Ii8 The decisions had the effect of transferring back to the
states the prime responsibility for the protection of individual
55. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1336-43.
56. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
57. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
58. The first in the series of decisions was the 1873 Supreme Court decision in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court held that a Louisiana law
creating a monopoly in a single corporation for slaughtering animals was a valid exercise
of the state's police power to protect the health of its citizens. Id. at 60-66. Even though
these grounds were adequate to dispose of the case, the Supreme Court chose to rule on
the broader constitutional argument raised by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had argued that
the fourteenth amendment gave national citizenship primacy over state citizenship, and
provided further that no state could abridge the privileges and immunities of national
citizens, among which was the privilege of engaging in the lawful business of slaughtering
animals. The Supreme Court held that the privileges and immunities clause covered only
national citizenship, and that an individual's civil rights derived only from his state citi. zenship. The Court held that national citizenship included only the few rights that grew
out of the relationship between the citizen and the national government, such as the
right to sue in the federal courts and the right to protection on the high seas. Id. at 6780.
The extremely narrow interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment remains valid law today. The clause has lain dormant ever since
as a defense against the infringement of an individual's civil rights, and "for all practical
purposes the privileges and immunities clause [has) passed into the realm of historical
oddities." See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1338.
The next set-back came three years later with the Supreme Court's 1875 decision in
United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The Cruikshank case involved an alleged violation of the conspiracy section of the 1870 act. That section prohibited two or
more persons from conspiring "to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen,
with intent to prevent or hinder [the) free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States." Act of
May 31, 1870, ch.114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision
in the Slaughterhouse Cases by holding that the right involved (here the right of Negroes to assemble) did not grow out of any relationship of the Negroes with the federal
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civil rights, "a result which the legislators of 1866 to 1875 had
expressly sought to prevent. "119
government, as would, for example, the right to assemble to petition Congress for a redress of grievances. Furthermore, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment applied
only to state action, and not to action by private individuals. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 55455.
The hardest blow to the post-Civil War civil rights legislation and amendments
came with the Ci~il Rights Cases of 1883, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court considered seven
cases together. Two involved the denial of accommodations at an inn to Negroes, four
involved the denial of accommodations at a theater or opera house to Negroes, and one
involved the denial of access to a railroad car to a Negro. These plaintiffs sued to enforce
a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which states that "all persons within ... the
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement." Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch.114, § 1, 18 Stat.
335, 336.
The Supreme Court declared that this provision was unconstitutional. The Court
again held that the fourteenth amendment applies only to state action, and it held that
because this provision was directed at individual action it was not authorized by any
provision in the Constitution. It held that persons wronged by the acts of individuals
must look to the laws of the state for redress. Civil" Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12.
The Supreme Court also addressed the argument that this provision is valid under
the thirteenth amendment. The Court held that the thirteenth amendment is applicable
to private actions and that it gives to Congress the power to outlaw all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States. But the Court then interpreted "badges and incidents of slavery" very narrowly. It held that the facts before it, the denial of admission
to an inn, theater, or railroad car because of one's race, did not involve any badge or
incident of slavery. The Court listed as incidents of slavery the disabilities to hold property, make contracts, have standing in court, and act as a witness against white persons,
among others. Thus it held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, passed under the thirteenth
amendment, is constitutional, and that the rights it guarantees relate to incidents of
slavery. Id. at 24-25.
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases "remains a living force in constitutional law," Gressman, supra note 12 at 1341 nA8 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 105 (1947)), and "deserves a high
place among the writings of American statesmen marking progress in the development of
democratic thought." Id. (citing M. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 13
(1947)). Harlan believed that the thirteenth amendment was passed to do more than
outlaw the master-slave relationship. He believed that it also provided former slaves
"such civil rights as belong to freedmen of other races" and that it gave Congress the
power to pass laws to protect former slaves against deprivation of their civil rights. Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 34-36. Harlan argued that state citizenship implies freedom
from race discrimination that threatens civil rights enjoyed by white citizens, that the
fourteenth amendment gave Congress the power to protect state citizenship, and that it
did not limit the power of Congress to protect citizens only against state action. He
believed that the fourteenth amendment applied at least to actions by the state, its officers, and individuals exercising public functions, which he believed included innkeepers, common carriers, and theater owners. Id. at 44-59.
See also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876).
59. Gressman, supra note 12, at 1342.
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Collectively, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
decisions have been described as a counter-revolution,60 and the
south's redemption. 61 They ushered in an era, uninterrupted until the civil rights movement of the 1960s, when the nation's individuals could not look to their national government for protection of "those fundamental rights which, by universal
concession, inhere in a state of freedom,"62 and when private individuals were free to discriminate on the basis of race in many
settings as long as their discriminatory actions could not be attributable to the state. 63
The civil rights movement of the 1960s brought renewed attention to the Reconstruction era civil rights laws, including the
1866 Civil Rights Act. Beginning in the 1960s the Supreme
Court's opinions began to reflect the view that the guarantee of
racial equality contained in the Civil War era statutes should be
enforced. 64
The first Supreme Court case to enforce the 1866 Act was

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 6/S In Jones, a private real estate

company refused to sell a house to plaintiff because of his race.
The plaintiff sued, claiming that this action violated his rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Like section 1981, section 1982 stems
from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; thus it is often
considered a companion to section 1981. 66 It states in part that
"(a)11 citizens of the United States shall have the same right ...
as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The Supreme
Court in Jones held that section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
prohibits private individuals from discriminating on the basis of
race in the sale or rental of property.67
60. [d. at 1337.
61. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 582.
62. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 34.
63. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1336-43. Actions affirmatively authorized by
state officials or permitted by state law are examples of actions which may be attributed
to the state.
64. See Note, supra note 29, at 1035.
65. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
66. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2383 (1989).
67. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-44.
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The Jones court held that the thirteenth amendment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were both passed in order to eliminate private as well as state racial discrimination. 68 In its analysis the Court noted that section 1982 contains very expansive
language, and it interpreted the statutory language "the same
right" to mean the right to treatment equal to that which whites
receive in private property transactions. 69 The Court next analyzed the legislative history of section 1 of the 1866 act, and concluded that Congress had intended that this Act reach private
discrimination. 70 To support its conclusion the Court cited the
great deal of evidence before Congress of private acts of discrimination in the south against blacks. Statements made during the
congressional debates on the bill, the Court found, showed that
the legislators were aware .of and intended to prohibit such
discrimination. 71
In his dissent Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the language and legislative history of the 1866
act. He believed that the statute's language and legislative history show that Congress intended only to grant to blacks equal
status before the law. To support his conclusion, he relied on
statements from the same congressional debates and by sorrie of
the same senators that were cited by the majority.72
Nine years after Jones, in Runyon u. McCrary,73 the Supreme Court was asked to use section 1981 to prohibit two private schools from discriminating in their admissions policies on
the basis of race. The Supreme Court held that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
private contracts." The Runyon majority treated as settled by
Jones, Tillman u. Wheaton-Hauen Recreation Association;7Il
68. [d. at 422-38.
69. [d. at 420-21.
70. [d. at 423-24.
71. [d. at 427-36.
72. [d. at 452-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This is a different Justice Harlan, with a
very different view of the scope of the Civil War era civil rights legislation, than the
Justice Harlan who dissented in the Civil Rights Cases eighty-one years earlier.
73. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
74. [d. at 168-75.
75. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Tillman the Court held that "in light of the historical
interrelationship between section 1981 and section 1982," there was no reason to construe those sections differently in applying them to a club that denied property-linked
membership preferences to blacks. [d. at 440.
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and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,76 that section 1981 applies to private acts of discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 77
Justice White's dissent, however, argued that Congress only
intended the Act to apply to discriminatory state action. Like
Justice Harlan in his Jones dissent, White cited statements
made during the congressional debates and the language of the
statute to support his argument. 7S
III. THE PATTERSON DECISION
A. F ACTS

OF THE CASE

Brenda Patterson was hired as a teller and file clerk at the
McLean Credit Union in May 1972. 79 She was interviewed for
the job by Robert Stevenson, then the general manager and
later president of the credit union. During the interview Mr.
Stevenson warned her that all her co-workers would be white
women and that they would not like working with a black. so
During the ten years that Ms. Patterson worked at the
credit union, Mr. Stevenson and other supervisors subjected Ms.
Patterson to various forms of racial harassment. Mr. Stevenson
told her several times that "blacks are known to work slower
than whites by nature," and he suggested numerous times that a
76. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson the Court stated in dicta that section 1981 applied to discrimination in the making and enforcing of private contracts. [d. at 459-60.
77. The majority did discuss, however, the issue of the origin of section 1981. See
supra note 49. The majority held that section 1981 derives from both section 1 of the
1866 Act (as reenacted into section 18 of the 1870 Act) and section 16 of the 1870 Act,
thus that section 1981 derives from both the thirteenth and the fourteenth amendments.
The Court stated that the codifier's note was either inadvertent or an error, and pointed
out that the 1874 codifiers had authority only to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate" existing laws. The majority in Runyon declined "to attribute to Congress an intent
to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of an unexplained omission from the codifier's marginal notes." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
Justice White's dissent, however, argued that section 1981 is derived solely from
section 16 of the 1870 Act, and thus has roots only in the fourteenth amendment and
may not be interpreted to reach private discrimination. The dissent based its conclusion
on the identical "all persons" language of section 1981 and section 16 of the 1870 Act
and the "unambiguous" codifier's note. [d. at 205-06 (White, J., dissenting).
78. [d. at 195-205 (White, J., dissenting),
79. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363. 2368 (1989).
80. [d. at 2392.
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white would be able to do a better job than Ms. Patterson. 81 Periodically Mr. Stevenson would stare at Ms. Patterson for several minutes at a time; he never did this to white employees. 82
Ms. Patterson also received disparate treatment in the
amount and type of work she was assigned. Mr. Stevenson and
the other supervisors assigned Ms. Patterson more tasks than
they assigned to her co-workers and when she complained about
this she received no help. Instead she was assigned more work
and told that she always had the option of quitting. 83 In addition, Ms. Patterson was assigned tasks that white employees
were not assigned, including dusting and sweeping. 84 Ms.
Patterson was also the only clerical worker whose work was not
reassigned to others during a vacation; instead it was allowed to
accumulate. 811 In addition, blacks at the credit union received
different treatment regarding performance evaluations. At staff
meetings Mr. Stevenson criticized Ms. Patterson and the only
other black employee individually by name, but he would only
discuss the performance of the other employees anonymously or
in general terms. 86
Ms. Patterson was singled out for different treatment regarding advancement at the credit union. She was never offered
training for higher level jobs even though white employees on
her level were offered such training. She was never promoted or
informed of any job openings even though whites were often
hired for more senior positions. 87 During Ms. Patterson's tenure,
one white employee with less seniority than she received training and a promotion. 88
Finally, Ms. Patterson's treatment regarding wage increases
was different from that of white employees. Although white employees received automatic pay increases after their first six
months, Ms. Patterson was denied such a pay increase. 89
81. Id.
82.Id.
83.Id.
84.Id.
85.Id.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88.Id.
89.Id.
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Ms. Patterson was laid off in July 1982. Shortly thereafter
she filed this action in federal district court. She alleged that the
credit union had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by harassing her, failing to promote her, and discharging her because of her race. 90
The district court held that section 1981 does not apply to racial
harassment, thus this claim was not submitted to the jury.91
Ms. Patterson appealed the district court's holding that section 1981 does not apply to racial harassment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that racial harassment is not
actionable under section 1981 because such harassment does not
abridge the right to make and enforce contracts. The court further held that such harassment may, however, be probative of
discriminatory intent in the making and enforcing of contracts. 92
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to'decide the issue whether section 1981 applies to racial harassment. 93 After oral argument, the Court on its own initiative requested the parties to brief and argue the additional issue of
whether the Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary, that section
1981 applies to discriminatory actions by private entities, should
be reconsidered. 94
B.

THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS

1.

The Runyon Decision

The majority first addressed the question whether Runyon
should be overturned. The Court concluded that Runyon should
not be overturned, and reaffirmed that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement. of private
contracts.
The majority reached this conclusion without ever addressing whether Runyon was correctly decided in light of section
1981's history and language. Instead, the majority based its decision entirely on the principal of stare decisis. It concluded that
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2369.
I d. at 2363.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
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none of the reasons that have been used in the past to overrule
prior decisions construing statutes was shown in this case. 911
Finding no reasons to adequately justify overruling Runyon
and finding that Runyon is consistent with society's commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination, the Court "decline[d] to overrule Runyon and acknowledge[d] that its holding
remains the governing law in this area. "96
2. Racial Harassment

Next the majority considered whether section 1981 prohibits racial harassment such as that to which Ms. Patterson was
subjected. The majority held that it does not. The majority began its analysis by noting the language of section 1981 and emphasizing that section 1981 prohibits discri~ination only in the
"making" and "enforcement" of contracts. The majority then
held that the language" 'the same right to ... make ... contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens' " applies "only to the
formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later
95. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370-72 (1989). Specifically
the Court listed three reasons for which it has overruled decisions which interpret statutes, and held that none of these provide adequate justification for overruling Runyon.
The first reason explored by the Court was "the intervening development of the law,
through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress." The
Court stated that "where such changes have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, ... or where the later law has rendered the decision
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, the Court has not hesitated to
overrule an earlier decision." The Court concluded that no subsequent changes or developments in the law have undermined the Runyon decision.
The next reason explored by the Court for overruling precedent was that a precedent may be a detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either because the
decision is unworkable or because the decision frustrates objectives embodied in other
laws. The Court then held that Runyon is not unworkable and does not frustrate the
objectives of any other laws.
Lastly, the Court stated that statutory precedents have been overruled in the past if,
after being tested by experience, they have been found inconsistent with this country's
sense of justice or social welfare. The Court concluded that this consideration does not
support overruling Runyon. The court stated:
Whether Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination is right or wrong as an initial matter,
it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense
of justice in this country. To the contrary, Runyon is entirely
consistent with our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of
his or her skin.
[d. at 2371.
96. [d. at 2372.
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from the conditions of continuing employment. "97 The opinion
explained that a racially motivated refusal to enter into a contract, or an offer to make a contract only on racially discriminatory terms, is prohibited by this language, whereas "conduct by
the employer after the contract relation has been established, including ... imposition of discriminatory working conditions," is
not prohibited by this language. 98
Next the opinion interpreted the section 1981 language
" 'the same right ... to ... enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens.' " The majority concluded that the language refers merely to protection of legal process and of a right of access
to legal process. 99 Efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes were cited
as examples of prohibited conduct. The majority concluded that
"the right to enforce contracts does not, however, extend beyond
conduct by an employer which impairs an employee's ability to
enforce through legal process his or her established contract
rights. 11100
The opinion then applied to Ms. Patterson's case the language it had so narrowly interpreted, and not surprisingly held
that the interpretation does not encompass her facts. The majority stated that none of the conduct to which Ms. Patterson was
subjected involves the refusal to enter into a contract or the impairment of her access to the legal process to enforce her contract. 101 • The conduct was rather "post-formation conduct by the
employer relating to the terms and conditions of continuing
employment. "102
In support of its holding, the majority stated that since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does prohibit the conduct
to which Ms. Patterson was subjected, "interpreting section 1981
to cover [such conduct] ... would ... undermine the detailed
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

[d.
[d. at 2373.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 2374.
[d.
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and well-crafted procedures for conciliation and resolution of Title VII claims."los The majority stated that it was "reluctant ...
to read an earlier statute broadly where the result is to circumvent the detailed· remedial scheme constructed in a later
statute. "I 04
C.

BRENNAN'S ANALYSIS

Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, concurred with the majority in its conclusion
that Runyon should be reaffirmed, but he based this conclusion
on "two very obvious reasons for refusing to overrule this interpretation of section 1981: that Runyon yvas correctly decided,
and that in any event Congress has ratified our construction of
the statute. "1011 These justices also dissented from the majority's
holding that section 1981 does not encompass Ms. Patterson's
racial harassment claim. lOS
1.

The Runyon Decision

In his conclusion that Runyon should be reaffirmed,
Brennan first argued that Runyon was correctly decided. l07 He
stated that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1981
has been "based upon a full and considered review of the statute's language and legislative history."108 He cited in detail and
with approval the analysis in Jones u. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
which interpreted the "same right" language of section 1982 and
the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Brennan's opinion endorsed the Jones Court's finding that
in 1866 there was" 'an imposing body of evidence [before Congress] pointing to the mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals and unofficial groups, mistreatment unrelated to any
hostile state legislation.' "l09 Brennan also emphasized Jones' interpretation of the congressional debates on the 1866 Act and
103. [d.
104. [d. at 2375.
105. [d. at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. [d.

107. [d.
108. [d.
109. [d. at 2382 (Bre~nan, J., dissenting).
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the earlier Freedman's Bureau bill as showing that these bills
were intended to reach private discrimination. no
Lastly, Brennan pointed out that since the Jones and
Runyon decisions, no new information had come before the
Court as to the origin of section 1981, or as to the legislative
history of the 1866 act. He concluded that the careful analysis in
Jones and Runyon is persuasive. ll1
Brennan's second reason for refusing to overrule Runyon
was that Congress has ratified the Supreme Court's construction
of section 1981. Congress ratified Runyon, Brennan argued,
when it considered and rejected an amendment to Title VII that
would have made section 1981 unavailable as a remedy in most
cases of private employment discrimination, and also when Congress enacted a statute that provides for the recovery of attorney
fees in section 1981 actions.1l2
The amendment to Title VII to which Brennan was referring is the amendment proposed by Senator Hruska in 1972 that
would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for private acts
of employment discrimination. Brennan pointed out that Senator Hruska stated in support of this amendment that he believed that both section 1981 and Title VII applied to private
discrimination, and that his amendment would eliminate this
overlap. Brennan explained that the amendment failed to win
passage, and later it failed to be reconsidered. Brennan concluded, citing Runyon, that this is a clear indication that Congress agrees that section 1981 does reach private acts of racial
discrimination.ll3
Brennan also argued that Congress' action in passing the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which permits
110. [d. at 2382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan also endorsed the conclusion
of the Runyon majority that section 1981 is derived from both section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. He reiterated that the
1874 revisors had only limited authority, and that probably the revisor's note printed
alongside section 1977 of the 1874 revisions (the present section 1981) was inadvertent or
an error. See supra notes 49 & 77.
111. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. [d. at 2385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. [d. at 2386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the recovery of attorney fees in section 1981 actions, "goes beyond mere acquiescence in [the Supreme Court's] interpretation
of section 1981,"114 and shows congressional ratification of the
Supreme Court's construction of section 1981.
2. Racial Harassment

Brennan's opinion also dissented from the majority's holding that section 1981 does not encompass racial harassment
which becomes manifest after contract formation. He argued
that the legislative history of section 1981 shows, through the
debates and evidence before Congress, not only that Congress
intended that the Acts from which section 1981 is derived reach
private discrimination, but also that those Acts were "designed
to protect the freedmen from the imposition of working conditions that evidence an intent on the part of the employer to contract on discriminatory terms."lUI
Brennan next argued that the language of section 1981 is
"naturally read as extending to cover post-forma~ion conduct
that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on
equal terms at all."116 Brennan interpreted the language "the
same right ... to make ... contracts ... as is enjoyed 'by white
citizens" as covering harassment if the harassment is so severe
or pervasive as to demonstrate that the employer has in fact
"made" a contract which includes discriminatory terms.1l7
Lastly, Brennan addressed the majority's argument that
since Title VII covers Ms. Patterson's claims, section 1981 need
not be construed to do so. He pointed out that Congress rejected
an amendment to Title VII that would make it the exclusive
remedy for these claims, thus that Congress envisioned Title VII
and section 1981 as alternative remedies.1l8 He also argued that
the existence of Title VII adds nothing to the question of how to
interpret section 1981, which was written almost 100 years
before Title VII and is broader in scope than Title VII.1l9 He
pointed out that section 1981 applies to all contracts, not just to
114. [d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

2387-88 (Brennan,
2388 (Brennan, J.,
2388-89 (Brennan,
2389 (Brennan, J.,
2390 (Brennan, J.,

J., dissenting).
dissenting).
J., dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).

[d.
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employment contracts, and that section 1981 differs from Title
VII in available remedies, applicable statute of limitations, the
right to a jury trial, the attorney fees recoverable, and the prerequisites to filing an action.120

D.

STEVENS' ANALYSIS

Justice Stevens concurred in the majority's holding that
Runyon should not be overruled. He also joined the portion of
Brennan's dissent that interpreted section 1981 as covering harassment when the harassment is so severe as to demonstrate
that a contract was "made" on discriminatory terms. He argued,
as did Brennan, that there is no real difference between a situation in which an employer reveals his or her intent to impose
discriminatory contract terms before contract formation and a
situation in which such intent is not revealed until after contract
formation, through intentional harassment and insult. 121
Stevens elaborated by arguing that even when an employer
does not form the intent to racially harass employees until after
contract formation, the employer is still guilty of discrimination
in the "making" of a contract. Stevens argued that this is so because a contract, rather than being a static "piece of paper," is
evidence of an ongoing relationship between humans, and that
humans constantly remake their contracts when duties or expectations change. 122 Therefore, an employer who imposes a policy
of harassment on a contract has "remade" the contract on discriminatory terms, and has violated section 1981. 123 Stevens supported his argument by stating that he believes that Runyon
would have been decided the same way had the schools allowed
the black students to attend, but subjected them to segregated
classes and other racial abuse. l24
IV. CRITIQUE
The Patterson majority refused to overrule Runyon v.
McCrary, and stated that it had not retreated "one inch" from
120. [d. at 2390-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. [d. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. [d.
123. [d. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124: [d.
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the national policy to forbid intentional racial discrimination.12lI
But Patterson's narrow construction of discrimination in the
making of a contract left section 1981 virtually useless against
racial discrimination. Notwithstanding the affirmance of Runyon, private actors are much freer to discriminate on the basis of
race after Patterson than before.
The Patterson majority's approach to the interpretation
and application of section 1981 was flawed and led to an incorrect interpretation for several reasons. First, the decision, in a
noticeable break from precedent, failed to consider clear evidence of the Thirty-ninth Congress' intent regarding the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Second, the opinion instead relied on an
overly restrictive interpretation of the language of the statute.
Third, the opinion relied on an overlap between section 1981
and the less effective Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
disregarding evidence of congressional intent that the two statutes be alternative remedies. Lastly, the Patterson majority
failed to consider strong public policy in its analysis.
Neither the majority's decision to uphold Runyon, nor the
decision that section 1981 does not apply to racial harassment
surfacing after contract formation, considered the history of the
enactment of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The majority opinion
ignored evidence of Congress' concerns over unfair and unequal
treatment of blacks at that time and the spirit in which the Act
originated. The failure to consider the legislative history and evidence of congressional intent regarding section 1981 was a major flaw in the opinion. Had congressional intent been considered, the Court would have held that section 1981 encompasses
racial harassment.
As Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the legislative history of section 1981 clearly indicated that the Thirty-ninth Congress intended to go beyond mere refusals to contract, and intended to protect blacks from discriminatory working
conditions. Brennan argued that Congress considered an 1865
report when it passed the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The report, by
Major General Carl Schurz, described post-contractual working
conditions of blacks in the South. The conditions included use
125. Id. at 2379.
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of the whip and the practice of handing out severe and unequal
punishment. Brennan concluded that this evidence showed that
Congress intended the language "the same right ... to make and
enforce contracts" to encompass post-contractual conduct. l26
In addition, when taken as a whole, the history of the
Thirty-ninth Congress leads to the conclusion that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 must be broadly construed. The Thirty-ninth
Congress was disturbed by the weakness and inefficacy of
Johnson's Reconstruction plan and by the grave racial inequality
in the south.l27 It implemented its own plan in order to bring
about more radical changes in the southern racial order. The
dedication of the Thirty-ninth Congress to the implementation
of a social order radically removed from the previous one and
the great deal of evidence before it of the Black Codes, injustice
at the hands of private individuals, and onerous working conditions, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended a broad
construction of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Lastly, the majority's failure to consider congressional intent was a noticeable and questionable departure from its previous analyses of the 1866 Act. The Jones, Runyon, Tillman, and
other 126 opinions all relied on the legislative history of the Act
and all concluded that the history called for a broad interpretation. Patterson's refusal to do so was a questionable break from
precedent.
Patterson's restrictive interpretation of the language of section 1981 was a second major flaw in its analysis. In arriving at
the holding that section 1981 does not encompass racial harassment, the majority interpreted the language of the statute as if
the words were in a vacuum. Its effort to define "make a contract" as merely the mechanical entry into the contractual relationship, and its effort to distinguish an offer to make a contract
on discriminatory terms from a contract that in fact contains
discriminatory terms once formed, was forced. The majority
drew an artificial line at the moment an enforceable contract is
recognized, and chose to ignore the manner in which contracts
126.
127.
128.
v. Santa

[d. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548'49.
See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); McDonald
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-95 (1976).
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containing discriminatory terms are formed in reality. Rarely
will a party who intends to contract on discriminatory terms disclose this intent up front.
Any contract "made" with discriminatory terms is prohibited by section 1981, not merely those contracts in which the
discriminatory party manifests this intent before the contract is
formed. The question whether a contract is "made" with discriminatory terms should be one of fact for the jury. The majority's decision deprived Ms. Patterson, and all those who follow
her, of this right.
The majority's attempt to support its interpretation of section 1981 by pointing out that Ms. Patterson's particular set of
facts is actionable under another statute was a third flaw in the
Court's analysis. The existence of one law should play no part in
the interpretation of another, unless the existence of one is probative of Congress' intent regarding the other. Congress enacted
section 1981 almost one hundred years before it enacted Title
VII; Title VII sheds no light on congressional intent regarding
section 1981. Furthermore, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent, there is strong evidence that Congress intends section
1981 and Title VII to be alternative remedies. 129 The evidence is
that Congress recently considered and rejected an amendment
to Title VII that would have made it the exclusive remedy for
private employment discrimination. ISO
The Court's failure to consider any public policy in its harassment analysis was another flaw in the majority decision.
When congressional intent is not considered, as in Patterson's
harassment analysis, it seems reasonable that a statute should
be interpreted by weighing conceivable congressional intentions
with policy considerations. There has been a strong public policy
in the United States since the Civil War in favor of the eradication of racial discrimination and inequality. The Patterson majority's failure to consider both this policy and congressional intent in its harassment holding is regrettable.
129. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. [d. at 2385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Fortunately, the majority did consider contemporary policies in the face of arguably non-discernible congressional intent
when it upheld Runyon. The majority pointed out that there is a
strong argument for the view that section 1981 does not reach
private conduct as well as for the view that it does. The majority
then held that "Runyon is entirely consistent with our society's
deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on
a person's race or the color of his or her skin,"13l and upheld the
decision.
As the Patterson majority pointed out, some victims of harassment in employment contracts may sue under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 132 A recent study found that approximately seventy-seven percent of section 1981 claims were
employment claims, and as such were covered by Title VII.133
However, Title VII often provides inadequate coverage for
claims of racial harassment in employment relations. 13"
First, Title VII requires several procedural prerequisites to
the filing of an action which section 1981 does not require. Title
VII requires that remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) be exhausted before a suit may be
filed in federal court, and it also requires that suits must be filed
within ninety days of the EEOC's decision whether to sue. Section 1981 has no requirement that a complaint first be filed with
the EEOC, and it has a more relaxed statute of limitations.
Second, Title VII is much more restrictive in the remedies it
allows. Punitive damages are not allowed under Title VII, and
back pay is limited to two years. Section 1981 contains neither
of these limitations. 1311
Third, no jury trials are allowed under Title VII claims,
whereas section 1981 claims may be tried before a jury.136
131. Id. at 2371.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(1982).
133. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, CORNELL L. REV. 596,
601 (1988). These authors studied every section 1981 case filed in three federal districts
in the fiscal year 1980 to 1981.. Id. at 598.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 602 n.38.
136. Id.
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Fourth, Title VII does not apply to employers of fewer than
fifteen employees. The result is that 86.3 % of all employers and
14.4% of all employees are exempt from Title VII claims. 137 Unlike Title VII, section 1981 has no such minimum employer size
requirement. ISB
Lastly, contracts other than employment are not covered by
Title VII. Thus victims of harassment in contracts involving
schools, banking services, recreational facilities, medical facilities, and independent services, among many others, have no
remedy comparable to section 1981, and will be left with a reduced chance of recovery or no chance at all. ls9
The immediate effect of Patterson's narrow interpretation
of section 1981 is to remove that law as a remedy for most
claims of racial harassment in contractual relations. A November
1989 study conducted by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund found
that in the four and one half months following the Patterson
decision, at least ninety-six racial discrimination claims were
dismissed under Patterson by federal judges. 140 The cases dismissed involved charges of racially discriminatory discharge,
harassment, promotion, and retaliation. Plaintiffs in the dismissed cases represented six different races. w The study
pointed out that a significant number of the dismissed claims
were not actionable under or could not be remedied under Title
VII for various reasons. 142 The study concluded that Patterson
has had a deterrent effect on attorneys asked to repres~nt or already representing civil rights plaintiffs, because the probability
of success has fallen too low and the possibility of Rule 11 sanctions for bringing the claims has risen too high. HS Because of the
reduced likelihood that employers will be held accountable for
racially discriminatory conduct, the study concluded, employers
Id. at 602.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 133, at 603-04.
Analysis by NAACP Legal Defense Fund on Impact of Supreme Court's Decision in Patterson u. McLean Credit Union, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 223, at D-1
(Nov. 21, 1989).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions
against attorneys who sign pleadings which are frivolous or intended to cause delay.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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may alter their
discrimination. 144

conduct

toward

[Vol. 20:617

increased

racial

Patterson is more than a significant deterrent to the eradication of racial discrimination in this country. Together with
several other civil rights decisions of the present Supreme Court,
it signals what may be the beginning of a period of judicial pruning of civil rights legislation similar to that of the late nineteenth century. Among the more notorious of Patterson's contemporaries are Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,1411 City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO./46 and Martin v. Wilks. 147
Wards Cove Packing Co. held that minority civil rights
plaintiffs may not prove employment discrimination using statistics on the adverse impact of an employer's hiring and promotion practices. Martin v. Wilks held that non-parties to a consent decree may challenge the plan on grounds of reverse
discrimination after it has been approved by a court.
City of Richmond ruled that a city's plan requiring prime .
contractors who have been awarded city construction contracts
to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of
each contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises"
violated the fourteenth amendment's' equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court held that the city failed to prove a compelling govenmental interest in remedying past racial discrimination. In order to prove discrimination through the use of statistical disparitites, a city must compare the number of existing and
already qualifying Minority Business Enterprises with the dollars awarded to such businesses; the disparity between the city's
minority population and dollars awarded to minority businesses
is not to be considered.
Collectively, these cases and Patterson seem comparable to
the decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Supreme Court effectively took the life out of
many Civil War era civil rights laws.
144,
145.
146,
147.

Id.
110 S. Ct. 38 (1989).
488 V,S. 469 (1989),
110 S. Ct. 11 (1989).
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Lastly, Patterson has had the effect of shifting the fight for
the eradication of racial discrimination and harassment to Congress and to state legislatures. It is toward these bodies that we
must look and direct our efforts for progress in the near future.
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